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A Categorization Scheme for Socialbot 
Attacks In Online Social Networks
Abstract
In the past, online social networks (OSN) like Facebook 
and Twitter became powerful instruments for 
communication and networking. Unfortunately, they 
have also become a welcome target for socialbot 
attacks. Therefore, a deep understanding of the nature 
of such attacks is important to protect the Eco-System 
of OSNs. In this extended abstract we propose a 
categorization scheme of social bot attacks that aims at 
providing an overview of the state of the art of 
techniques in this emerging field. Finally, we 
demonstrate the usefulness of our categorization 
scheme by characterizing recent socialbot attacks 
according to our categorization scheme. 
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Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) like Facebook and 
Twitter can be used for many different purposes, such 
as searching advice or organizing political protests. 
Such usage can be disturbed arbitrarily, as for instance 
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shown in [16] where researchers report that certain 
hashtags on Twitter, which were used to organize 
protests regarding the Russian parliamentary election, 
were spammed until they become useless as a channel 
of communication among protesters. Recently 
socialbots, which are automated agents in OSNs that 
can perform certain actions on their own have spread in 
OSNs. Past research for example inspected a variety of 
characteristics for distinguishing between users 
susceptible and non-susceptible to socialbot attacks 
[18]. In this work, we extend this research and propose 
a comprehensive categorization scheme of social bot 
attacks. We demonstrate the utility of the 
categorization scheme by categorizing exemplary OSN 
attacks, described in previous research.
Categorization of Socialbot Attacks
To gain a deeper understanding of the variety of 
socialbot attacks, we developed a categorization 
scheme of socialbot attacks to aid future comparison 
and systematic investigations into this emerging 
phenomenon. Our categorization scheme allows 
categorizing social bot attacks along different 
dimensions. In the following we describe our 
methodology, and then proceed to introducing the 
categorization scheme in detail. Finally, we show how 
the categorization scheme can be used to categorize 
exemplary socialbot attacks which recently took place 
in OSNs.
Methodology
The categorization scheme was created following an 
iterative process, by executing the following steps:
 We inspected existing research literature to identify 
similarities and differences between socialbot attacks as 
basis to form dimensions and categories within 
dimensions. 
 We considered the Six problems of categorization 
introduced in [14].
 Then we evaluated the quality of our categorization 
system by considering properties and requirements 
based on previous work regarding categorization 
schemes (e.g. [3][4][8][11][13])1: unambiguous and 
well defined, repeatable and objective, exhaustive, 
useful, based on technical details, identifying internal 
vs. external threats and similar but multiple 
classification. Since attacks may be complex we do not 
claim mutual exclusiveness.
 We demonstrate applicability of the scheme by 
categorizing existing attacks (described in publications 
or on media sites), as shown in Table 1.
 Finally, we discussed our proposal with other 
researchers, and incorporated feedback.
A Categorization Scheme for Socialbot Attacks
Based on several former taxonomy proposals in related 
fields (e.g.[9]) we defined dimensions for describing 
and categorizing socialbot attacks: Targets, Account 
Types, Vulnerabilities, Attack Methods and Results. 
Every dimension is hierarchically built as a tree where 
leafs represent the categories. Dimensions differ in 
width and depth, but the levels of abstraction within 
dimensions are consistent. In the following we explain 
the utility of each dimension in detail.
1 This evaluation was not performed in a strict manner, 
rather we used these requirements during the 
development of our categorization scheme to guide and 
steer the process.
Targets
One or several targets are involved in socialbot attacks. 
Therefore we identify who or what is attacked as a 
target. This is not necessarily the same as who or what 
comes to harm in the end (see Results dimension). As 
shown in Figure 1, an individual entity, a collection of 
entities, or the OSN itself can be the target of an 
attack. We define an entity as a resource, which has its 
own space within the OSN. Examples can be users, 
events or locations, which have their own pages within 
the OSN, such as user accounts or hashtags on Twitter. 
A collection of entities can be formed by social 
relations, by traits (rather static properties of an entity 
such as the user account age of an user entity) or by 
states (rather dynamic properties such as the user 
mood or interest of a user entity or the number of 
attendees of an event entity). 
Vulnerabilities
Attacks usually require certain vulnerabilities (see 
Figure 2), which can be exploited in order to facilitate 
the attack. We distinguish between OSN-specific and 
general system vulnerabilities which have already been 
analyzed and categorized in previous work (e.g. see the 
CVE2 standard) and are therefore not further discussed 
here. Vulnerabilities described in this categorization 
scheme focus on specific OSN functionalities caused by 
2 http://cve.mitre.org/  
the system or by users. System vulnerabilities can 
emerge from the tradeoff between providing an 
unrestricted, uncensored platform and the need for 
security. For example unprotected Entity Information 
can enable potential attackers to retrieve valuable 
information about a user's relations and activities. IP 
Usage vulnerabilities allow attackers to send requests 
with no or insufficient IP limitation. Also vulnerabilities 
regarding API Usage or Unverified Account Creation can 
arise. User Account Actions describe missing system 
regulations regarding how many actions are allowed 
per user within a given time frame. For example, 
ineffective CAPTCHAs can enable adversaries to obtain 
access to the system with no or little effort. 
Unrestricted Channel or Topic Usage means that 
everyone can use communication channels in an 
unrestricted manner - e.g. one does not have to belong 
to a specific community in order to use the 
community's communication channel. 
Unrestricted User Interactions allow users to interact 
with each other regardless of their social relations or 
other information and restrictions. Since OSNs are 
driven by users and their behavior, vulnerabilities also 
arise from user behavior. Users may participate in 
Figure 1: Targets Dimension
Figure 2: Vulnerabilities Dimension
malicious actions, participate in an untrusted 
communication, establish social connections with 
strangers (untrusted social relations) or accept 
unknown sources or links.
Attack Methods
Different socialbots adopt different attack methods (see 
Figure 3). An attack method describes how an attack is 
conducted. Again, we concentrate on attack methods 
within the OSN functionality. OSN topics can be used in 
an abusive way, changing the initial meaning of a topic 
to a specific new one (hijacking a topic) or just 
destroying the meaning (censoring a topic) by 
automatically creating a large amount of new entries. 
Unsolicited Communication means that socialbots send 
messages and communicate in an unsolicited way. 
Clickjacking attacks try to trick users to click on links 
embedded in unobtrusive context. It can be used within 
the abusive usage of topics or within unsolicited 
communication, and therefore clickjacking itself is not 
represented as a separate attack method in our 
categorization scheme. The same applies to Affiliation 
Attacks, where attackers try to make a user buy 
something on a specific website and in return receive 
commission. Another attack method is Spoofing which 
is defined as the action of impersonating a specific user 
to perform an attack. 
Setting Traps may be a rather passive attack method. 
It can be used to e.g., attract specific users interested 
in specific topics or malicious accounts e.g., by using 
bots in a similar way as Honeypots. Honeypots are 
known from the security sector, where they are used to 
send adversaries down the wrong track to distract them 
from real potential system vulnerabilities. In OSNs they 
may arouse interest without directly addressing other 
accounts. Another example of setting traps is to leave 
traces. In some OSNs users can e.g. see who visited 
their profile and socialbots may perform an attack by 
leaving traces to gain users' interest. 
Account Types
We distinguish between four different account types 
(see Figure 4). Compromised Accounts originally belong 
to benign users but are taken over by socialbots. 
Creepers Accounts belong to users willing to e.g., 
temporarily sell their accounts for advertising purposes 
via services such as pay4tweet3 or Pay with a Tweet4. 
Accounts, only created for being used within attacks 
are called Fraudulent Accounts. Finally, if the OSN 
allows it, socialbots may also conduct attacks within the 
OSN without using any account. Categorizing attacks 
originating from outside the OSN (exogenous to the 
system) are beyond the scope of this work.
3 http://www.pay4tweet.com/  
4 http://www.paywithatweet.com/  
Figure 4: Account Types Dimension
Figure 3:Attack Methods Dimension
Results
Finally, different socialbot attacks lead to different 
results (see Figure 5), which are the observable 
outcome of an attack. We split results depending on 
whether an active change in the OSN is achieved or 
not. Changed Social Graph, Modified Communication 
Channel or Topics, Injured Accounts (hacked or 
blocked) and Injured OSN (e.g. long response time) are 
active results. A passive result is if an attacker gains 
access to sensible data.
Applying Categorization Scheme to Attacks
In Table 1 we exemplarily show how our categorization 
scheme can be used to describe and categorize 
attacks in OSNs. Towards this end, we use previous 
research regarding Spam or bot attacks in OSNs. Since 
the main focus of existing research often concentrates 
on defense mechanisms etc, attacks are often 
described only partially and therefore cannot be 
categorized along all dimensions.
Conclusions
In this work we present a categorization scheme for 
social bot attacks which provides a much needed first 
overview of the state of the art of attacks in OSNs. We 
hope that our work represents a stepping stone for 
more principled investigations into the role of socialbots 
in OSNs. We believe that a better understanding of 
such attacks is essential in ensuring that OSNs become 
a trustworthy and effective tool for exchanging of ideas 
and information.
Figure 5: Results Dimension
Table 1: Applying categorization scheme to socialbot attacks
Dimension Category
Target Indidividual Entity [2,5]
Entity Collection
by Social Relations [5,15]
by Traits no example
by States [1,16]
OSN no example
Outside OSN out of scope
Account Type No Account no example
Creeper
Compromised [6,7]
Fraudulent [1,2,5,12,15,16,17]
Vulnerability CVE and others out of scope
OSN Functionality
System
Entity Information [1,2,5,15]
API Functionality [1,5,7,12,15,16,17]
IP Usage [16]
[1,2,5,12,15,16,17]
User Account Actions [5,17]
[6,7,10,12,16,17]
User Interaction [1,5,6,7,15,17]
User
Social Relations [1,2,5,12,15]
Communication [1,2,15]
[7]
Attack Method Abusive Usage of Topics [7,10,12,16,17]
Unsolicited Communication [1,6,7,15,17]
Attacking Social Graph [1,5,15]
Spoofing no example
Setting Traps [2,12]
Outside OSN Functionality out of scope
Result Changed Social Grpah [1,2,5,12,15,17]
Injured OSN no example
Injured Account no example
Passive Results [5]
Empirical 
Example
pay4tweet, 
paywithtweet
Unverified Account 
Creation
Channel or Topic 
Usage
Participation in 
Malicious Actions
pay4tweet, 
paywithtweet
Accepting Unkown 
Sources or Links
Within OSN 
Functionality
Actively Changed 
OSN
Modified Communication Channels 
or Topics
[1,2,6,7,10,12, 
15,16,17]
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